Abstract. On a filtered probability space (Ω, F, (Ft) t∈ [0,∞] , P), we consider the two-player nonzero-sum stopping game
Introduction
On a filtered probability space (Ω, F, (F t ) t∈[0,∞] , P), we consider the two-player non-zero-sum stopping game u i (ρ, τ ) := E[U i (ρ, τ )], i = 1, 2, where the first player choose a stopping strategy ρ to maximize u 1 and the second player chose a stopping strategy τ to maximize u 2 . Unlike the Dynkin game, here we assume that U (s, t) is F s∨t -measurable instead of F s∧t -measurable. That is, the game ends at the maximum of ρ and τ . Moreover, ρ and τ are not stopping times. They are some strategies satisfying some non-anticipativity condition. By assuming the continuity of U i in (s, t), we show that there exists an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for any ǫ > 0.
We first provide some results in the zero-sum case. In particular, we construct an ǫ-saddle point. (A more general version for the zero-sum case has been studied in [1] .) Then we construct an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the non-zero-sum game by using the ǫ-saddle points in the zero-sum case.
To avoid the technical difficulties stemming from the verification of the path regularity of some related processes, we assume that the state space is at most countable. Besides, we assume that the payoff function U i is uniformly continuous in (t, s). These assumptions, though restricted, help us concentrate on the interesting parts of the paper. It can be expected that the result still holds in a more general framework (The right continuity of U i is always in force).
Compared to the non-zero-sum Dynkin game (see e.g., [3, 6] ), our game is more applicable. In practice, even if a player has made the decision first, her payoff can still be affected by other players' decisions later on. Therefore, it is more reasonable to let the game end at the maximum rather than the minimum of the stopping strategies. As far as we know, this is the first paper studying the stopping games with this feature in a non-zero-sum setup. (Recently there are two papers [1, 2] on the stopping games with this feature in the zero-sum case.)
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the setup and the main result. In Section 3, we provide some results in the zero-sum case. In Section 4, we use the results from the zero-sum case to construct an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the non-zero-sum stopping games.
The setup and the main result
Let (Ω, F, (F t ) t∈[0,∞] , P) be a filtered probability space, where without loss of generality F = F ∞ = ∪ t∈[0,∞) F t , and the filtration (F t ) t∈[0,∞] satisfies the usual conditions. To avoid the technical difficulties stemming from the verification of the path regularities of some related related processes, we assume that Ω is at most countable, and that P is supported on Ω. Let T be the set of stopping times taking values in [0, ∞]. For any σ ∈ T , denote T σ (resp. T σ+ ) as the set of stopping times that is no less (resp. strictly greater) than σ. Let
Definition 2.1. ρ = (ρ 0 , ρ 1 ) is said to be a stopping strategy, if ρ 0 ∈ T and ρ 1 ∈ T. Denote the set of stopping strategies as T.
For simplicity, we assume that U i is bounded, and for any s, t ∈ [0, ∞), the limits
We make the following assumption on U i . 
Consider the two-player non-zero-sum stopping game
Here the first player choose ρ to maximize u 1 and the second player choose τ to maximize u 2 .
Recall the definition of an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.3. For ǫ > 0, (ρ * , τ * ) ∈ T 2 is said to be an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the stopping game (2.1), if for any ρ, τ ∈ T,
Below is the main result of this paper.
Theorem 2.4. Under Assumption 2.2, there exists an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for (2.1) for any ǫ > 0.
Zero-sum case
In this section, we consider (2.1) in the zero-sum case, i.e., we assume
Proof. Fix t ∈ [0, ∞). Let t n ց t with |t n − t| < 1/n. Let
ThenX t = X t . We have that lim sup
By [5, Theorem D.7] , lim sup n→∞ |X tn −X t | = 0. Hence, the result follows.
Let
and consider the zero-sum Dynkin game
By (3.1) and Lemma 3.1, and the game has a value and there exists an ǫ-saddle point (ρ ǫ 0 , τ ǫ 0 ) ∈ T 2 for any ǫ > 0,. That is, v = v and for any ρ 0 , τ 0 ∈ T ,
Now let h > 0. For each n ∈ N, letρ(nh) ∈ T nh be the ǫ-optimizer for Y nh . That is,
and ρ h (∞) = ∞. Then it is easy to see that ρ h ∈ T. Similarly, letτ (nh) be the ǫ-optimizer for X nh , and define
and τ h (∞) = ∞. Observe that ρ h (·, ω) and τ h (·, ω) are right continuous for each ω ∈ Ω. This right continuity will play an important role in the proof of Theorem 2.4 in the next section.
Lemma 3.2. For any ǫ > 0, there exists h ′ > 0, such that for any h ∈ (0, h ′ ),
Now choose h ′ > 0, such that r(h ′ ) < ǫ/3. Then the result follows.
Proposition 3.3. For any ǫ > 0, let ρ ǫ = (ρ ǫ 0 , ρ h ) and τ ǫ = (τ ǫ 0 , τ h ), where (ρ ǫ 0 , τ ǫ 0 ) is a saddle point for (3.2), and h is small enough such that (3.5) holds. Then (ρ ǫ , τ ǫ ) is a 5ǫ-Nash equilibrium for (2.1) when U 1 = −U 2 = U . Hence Theorem 2.4 holds in the zero-sum case.
Proof. Let ρ = (ρ 0 , ρ 1 ) ∈ T. We have that
Similarly, we can show that
Remark 3.4. We can also consider the sub-game of (2.1)
where
Follow the same proof as above, we can show that
σ is a 5ǫ-Nash equilibrium for (3.6) when
is an ǫ-saddle point for the sub-Dynkin game
Moreover, as can be seen from the proof of Proposition 3.3, for any
Proof of Theorem 2.4
Throughout this section, we fix ǫ > 0. For t ∈ [0, ∞], let
and
Similar to (3.3) and (3.4), for i = 1, 2, letρ i (nh) andτ i (nh) be ǫ-optimizers for Y i nh and X i nh respectively, and define
By Lemma 3.2, we choose h small enough with r(h) < ǫ/3, such that for i = 1, 2, and any ρ 0 , τ 0 ∈ T ,
For t ∈ [0, ∞], let us define
Lemma 4.1. For i = 1, 2, the process
On the right-hand-side of the inequality above, denote the first term as I and the second term as J. We have that
Observe that the process 
By [6, Lemma 8 ], the process (v i t ) t∈[0,∞] is right continuous for i = 1, 2. Define stopping times
Since X 1 ≤ W 1 , we have that
Therefore, the process (
is a sub-martingale. Let δ > 0 that will be chosen later on. For i = 1, 2, let (ρ i µ i +δ , τ i µ i +δ ) ∈ T 2 µ i +δ be an ǫ-saddle point for game G i µ i +δ defined in (4.1) and (4.2). Define
, otherwise, and
Let ρ * := (ρ * 0 , ρ * 1 ) and τ * := (τ * 0 , τ * 1 ). It can been shown that ρ * , τ * ∈ T.
Proposition 4.2. For δ small enough, (ρ * , τ * ) is an 18ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the non-zero-sum game (2.1). Therefore, Theorem 2.4 holds.
Proof. Now for any ρ = (ρ 0 , ρ 1 ) ∈ T, we consider u 1 (ρ, τ * ) = E[U 1 (ρ[τ * ], τ * [ρ])]. We discuss five cases.
Case 1: A 1 := {ρ 0 < µ 1 ∧ µ 2 }. We have that 
